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The author explores the contributions of three biologists—Ernst Mayr, E. O. Wilson,
and Lynn Margulis—to evolutionary theories of ethics. In particular, how does each relate
his or her view of ethics to naturalistic and humanistic philosophies? A humanistic ethic
could lead to appeals to some sort of "transcendence" that is scientifically suspect. Natu-
ralistic ethics, on the other hand, could lead to a sterile view of human culture. Can these
two be brought together into some kind ofnaturalistic humanism? This essay presents some
initial steps in this direction, based on a survey of the thought of these scientists.
Introduction
There are currently a number of signifi-
cant voices in the biological community as-
serting some form of evolutionary philoso-
phy. Ernst Mayr has proposed an evolution-
ary humanism; his former student, E. O. Wil-
son, propounds something more akin to an
evolutionary naturalism. Lynn Margulis also
seems to support some kind of evolutionary
naturalism. I will explore here various as-
pects of these three biologists' philosophies,
with an eye toward a constructive proposal
of my own that falls in the general vicinity
of evolutionary philosophies.
An initial definition of terms should
shed some light on the direction to pursue in
the more constructive phase of this work. In
laying out the linguistic groundwork, re-
course must inevitably be made to the ac-
tual philosophies offered by Mayr, Wilson,
and Margulis. This initial step is two-fold:
to be clear on what is meant, and to examine
what each of these biologists is proposing.
With this foundation firmly in place, each
of these authors may be examined in turn,
exploring the particular use to which each
puts the rubric of evolution, and how each
justifies this usage. At that point, it will be
important to ask two questions. In the first
place, where does each thinker find justifi-
cation for his or her philosophy? And sec-
ondly, is the evidence convincing that these
authors can, in fact, find justification for their
philosophy where they think they can? This
analysis will hopefully indicate which paths
are most promising for the constructive
phase of this project.
A preliminary caveat
An important question comes quite
naturally out of this second stage of the in-
quiry. If some, or all, of these authors can-
not find justification for their ethical program
where they think they can, where does their
justification come from? It is not the case
that they do not justify their claims; they do,
precisely because they want them to have a
normative authority. Yet, if this authority
comes not from evolution, where does it
originate? This question embodies the most
significant philosophical problem for each
of these evolutionary philosophies. How it
is answered. I claim, makes all the differ-
ence in the world.
In arguing for a strictly evolutionary
justification, any ethical program must ei-
ther fail or be radically redrawn in ways that
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make some people quite uncomfortable
(relativistic post-modernism qua science).
But if an external source for authority is ad-
mitted, would that not undermine the very
objective of these philosophies, which is to
provide a scientific account of how humans
should exist in the world—that is, a natural-
istic ethic? Perhaps not, as both Mayr and
Wilson seem quite ready to recognize that
human behavior is not entirely reducible to
natural scientific accounts. Clearly, human
behavior must be consonant (to use a popu-
lar "science-and -religion*' term) with a natu-
ral science description. That is, human be-
havior is constrained in important ways by
the laws of biology, the laws of chemistry,
the laws of physics, and finally the laws of
quantum mechanics, as we know them. But
this does not mean—and Mayr expresses this
quite nicely—that human behaviors can be
entirely explained, say, in terms of chemical
laws. So, what does it mean? In terms of
evolutionary philosophies, it means that one
can claim that ethical imperatives do not
derive solely from the way molecules inter-
act, nor (more relevantly ) from the way natu-
ral selection works. One can also justifiably
claim that evolutionary epiphenomena, such
as culture, can provide principles to guide
ethical behavior.
Of course, the preceding does need fur-
ther explication. Wilson, for example, might
be inclined to assert a stronger link between
culturally motivated ethical systems and
natural selection. 1 While natural selection
does not provide the raw material of ethical
thought, it certainly constrains it. Or better,
it acts on it. For Wilson—and for Mayr, for
that matter—ethical systems are selected
for.
2 Culture, then, is a source of novelty,
but evolution is the ultimate arbiter of which
ethical systems will survive.3 A second point
is that identifying culture as a possible justi-
fication for philosophical systems opens the
can of worms alluded to earlier : post-mod-
ernism. Wilson's response, just outlined, is
one attempt to avoid this slippery slope: no
need to descend into the hell of a thousand
equally valid ethical systems, thanks to the
selective power of evolution. All philoso-
phies are not equal; some systems survive
and some do not. Those that do, succeed
because, in some sense, they are better—bet-
ter adapted or suited to their environment.
The clever post-modernist should not de-
spair, however: Wilson's thought on this
subject is not the last word. The appeal to
evolution does not allow anyone to say, in
any ultimate sense, that one philosophical
system is better than another, simply by the
fact of its existence. After all, isn't it true
that evolution does not make value judg-
ments? Species x cannot be said to be "bet-
ter" than species y, except with the all-im-
portant tag, "for a given environment." So,
basing a philosophy on evolutionary con-
cepts seems to lead to an interesting quan-
dary: Does it allow strong normative claims
to be made? Some believe that it does—or,
at least, that it allows strong-enough claims.
Others turn, whether they acknowledge it or
not, to alternative sources. And where are
such alternative sources to be found, with
the authority to allow normative claims?
Definition of terms
Mayr identifies his ethical project with
that of the nineteenth-century evolutionist,
Julian Huxley. Mayr terms this perspective
"evolutionary humanism." According to
Huxley, this is "a belief in mankind [sic], a
feeling of solidarity with mankind, and a
loyalty toward mankind." 4 Of course, such
a feeling of solidarity could have any num-
ber of underlying sources. Huxley explic-
itly chose biological evolution as his foun-
dation:
Man is the result of millions of years of
evolution, and our most basic ethical
principle should be to do everything
toward enhancing the future of mankind.
All other ethical norms can be derived
from this baseline." 5
In aligning himself with Huxley, Mayr af-
firms evolution as the baseline from which
all particular ethical norms can be drawn. It
is important to ask. given Mayr's affinity for
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Huxley's humanism, if he also shares
Huxley's overriding belief in progress. 6 If
so, what might this mean for his evolution-
ary interpretation of ethics? Mayr's version
of evolutionary humanism will be pursued
in more depth below.
Evolution.
I begin with this term, because it seems
this might be the easiest to define. After
all, it is used quite often in everyday lan-
guage, so it might be expected to have a
clear meaning. What is meant by this term,
in the context of either evolutionary human-
ism or evolutionary naturalism as an ethi-
cal system? Does it imply that an ethical
scheme will be dynamic—always in flux
in response to the changing conditions in
the environment of humankind? And to be
clear, what is meant by humankind! Is the
focus at the level of individuals, of societ-
ies, or somewhere in between? Or perhaps
by evolution we have in mind the idea that
our ethical systems have evolved through
the process of natural selection. Should this
be taken literally, that is, in a strict biologi-
cal sense? Or would it be preferable to
assert that ethical systems evolved through
a process of cultural
evolution? In thinking
further about the normal
usage of this term, it be-
comes clear that the
concept of evolution is
polysemic, which often
leads to confusion. I
shall sort through some
of these various mean-
ings and attempt to de-
termine what Mayr,
Wilson, and Margulis
mean by the term, evolution.
Actually, in turning back to these au-
thors, the task should be greatly simplified.
All three are biologists who are quite fa-
miliar with the theoretical content of evo-
lution, and so should be clear in their use of
it. All three would. I believe, argue that by
using evolution in their ethic they do mean
to say that the ethical system is dynamic.
"Significant groups"—that is, a group with
a unique identity by virtue of their shared
values—create their ethical systems in such
a way as to respond to the world around
them. Given sufficient changes in their en-
vironment, any particular set of ethical be-
liefs can reasonably be expected to change
as a result. I justify this claim by recourse
to the second possibility noted above. All
three authors would also agree that ethical
systems have evolved through the process
of natural selection. This is precisely why
any ethical system would be expected to
change, in response to dramatic environ-
mental changes. They would have to: if
they no longer were suited to the environ-
ment, they would simply disappear. They
would be selected against, in favor of more
adaptive systems.
A lot has been claimed here, and it
might be wise to explicate some of it, be-
fore moving on. In the first place, some,
and perhaps all, of the authors would not
want to make a strong claim regarding the
evolution of ethical systems. Secondly, as
already indicated, the definition of evolu-
Basing a philosophy on evolutionary
concepts seems to lead to an interesting
quandary: Does it allow strong norma-
tive claims to be made? Some believe
that it does, or at least that it allows
strong-enough claims.
tion needs to be clarified. Is strictly bio-
logical evolution under consideration here,
or also cultural evolution?
All the authors would acknowledge the
existence of cultural evolution. In fact, all
three have argued for a significant role for
cultural evolution in the development of such
phenomena as religion and ethical systems. 7
The Boston Theological Institute 231
That is not to say, however, that these cul-
tural institutions have developed indepen-
dently of biological evolution. (This is an
important point that will be developed fur-
ther.) What does this relationship between
culture and biology tell about their views on
the evolution of ethical systems'? These sys-
tems are seen as the joint product of what
Wilson calls "gene-culture evolution" and
elsewhere has been called "bio-cultural evo-
lution. 8 But regarding the ethical systems
under consideration here—evolutionary hu-
manism or naturalism—there is a surprising
emphasis on the cultural. This is important
in understanding why Mayr, for example,
would be unwilling to make a strong claim
about the evolution of ethical systems. Mayr
states, "Evolution does not provide us with
a codified set of ethical norms." 9 The strong
claim being rejected here is not that natural
selection does not act on ethical systems, but
rather that evolution does not provide the
specific ethical system being selected for.
This is a crucial distinction in what is meant
by evolutionary humanism/naturalism.
By formulating their ethical systems in
the context of evolutionary theory, none of
the authors makes the claim that biological
evolution can provide a complete explana-
tion for human moral behavior. What they
assert is that evolution, understood now sim-
ply as directed by natural selection, con-
strains ethical systems in significant ways. 10
Specifically, if an ethical system becomes
too far removed from the kinds of ethical
situations people find themselves in, it will
no longer be effective in helping them make
good decisions and, so, will necessarily give
way to systems that are more suited to the
environment. What is important to recog-
nize in this argument, however, is the un-
stated assertion that, despite all the power
that human beings seem to have, biology is
still the ultimate arbiter of what will exist
and what will not. The biological part of
bio-cultural evolution plays the role of se-
lection. The cultural part plays the role of
mutation." Culture provides the novel ethi-
cal norms to put to the test. Of course, cul-
ture does have some selective power in de-
termining which of these novel principles get
put into widespread usage; but this is only on
a short-term timescale. On a truly evolution-
ary timescale, biological selection is the mas-
ter of the game. It would seem, then, that,
for these authors, evolution refers more prop-
erly to biological processes than cultural ones.
Humanism and naturalism.
These terms might be easier to specify.
The kind of humanism espoused by Mayr
(after Huxley) represents what in religious
circles has come to be known as anthropo-
centrism. Recall Huxley's words:
Our most basic ethical principle should
be to do everything toward enhancing
the future of mankind. 12
Mayr's is a vision of human beings as the
pinnacle of the world, responsible in unique
ways for the well-being of the planet. He
writes,
Every generation is the current caretaker
not only of the human gene pool but
indeed of all nature on our fragile
globe. 13
Mayr's ethic is based on the idea that sur-
vival of the human species is paramount.
That our species should be concerned for the
rest of the planet reinforces this primary con-
cern; If too much of the world is destroyed,
we put their own future in serious jeopardy.
The relation to evolution should be
clear. When Mayr asserts an ethic based on
evolutionary humanism, he has in mind two
things. First of all is the kind of evolution-
ary reading of ethics outlined previously. If
an ethical system drifts too far from the kinds
of normative prescriptions that allow us to
thrive in our environment, it will be forced
into extinction, in favor of a new scheme.
Mayr's environmental concerns are based on
this kind of reading. He interprets contem-
porary Western society as dangerously out
of balance with the environment. Thus, a
particular ethical system will be selected
against, unless it is able to adapt itself to the
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realities of environmental degradation. This
leads directly to Mayr's second idea: if we
do not change our values, that is, change the
way we make ethical decisions, we will be-
come extinct. It would seem that selection
can be seen acting at various levels: there is
selection for ethical norms, and there is the
more "basic" selection, simply for survival.
Ethics, then, can be given a direct evolution-
ary reading as an adaptive characteristic of
our species.
The question remains: What does hu-
manism refer to, in Mayr's evolutionary hu-
manism? From what has just been said, it
would seem that it is intended to represent
an ethical system based in biological evolu-
tion (with appropriate nods to cultural evo-
lution) that seeks to maximize human well-
being. With this as its base, it then branches
out to non-human aspects of the world, with
the intent of identifying our proper relations
to them.
It is interesting to note that while hu-
manism refers to an emphasis on humanity
and human values, naturalism does not re-
Mayr interprets contemporary Western
society as dangerously out of balance
with the environment. Thus, a particular
ethical system will be selected against,
unless it is able to adapt itself to the reali-
ties of environmental degradation.
fer to an emphasis upon nature. A humanis-
tic philosophy can also be naturalistic, and
vice versa. The "nature" in naturalism is
getting at something else. What this is, how-
ever, is rather complicated. Willem Drees,
drawing on the work of Peter Strawson, as-
serts that there are at least two ways of us-
ing the word, naturalism. On the one hand,
there is soft naturalism. This is what is meant
when a painting is refered to as naturalist.
It refers to "what we ordinarily do and be-
lieve as humans, say about colours, feelings,
and moral judgements." I4 On the other
hand, there is hard naturalism. This is the
naturalism that tries to explain human be-
ings in objective, scientific language. It is
the attempt to explain human behavior as if
it is like any other phenomenon in the natu-
ral world.
Given these two definitions, how would
one characterize these three authors? Are
they soft or hard naturalists? Wilson might
be easier to identify clearly. Drees points
out that hard naturalism is often developed
in terms of the scientific method. In doing
this, one is committing oneself to the view
that no things exist that, in principle, lie out-
side the scope of scientific explanation. I5
This vision seems similar to what Wilson
exhibits in Consilience: we may not yet be
able to give a scientific account of every as-
pect of human beings and the world, but we
should be able to at some future point. What
about Mayr and Margulis? Margulis cer-
tainly seems to be entertaining a similar idea
when she interprets religion as an evolution-
ary adaptive phenomenon for increasing
p group cohesion.
1
" Like-
wise, Mayr gives reli-
gion an evolutionary
role. But does giving
religion or ethics an
evolutionary interpreta-
tion mean that their pos-
sibilities have been ex-
hausted? Yes and no.
Mayr hedges his bets on
this score, and this may
explain why he, of the three authors, is the
one who asserts an evolutionary humanism.
Margulis is much closer to Wilson: while
religion and ethics can be discussed at a
"higher" level, in important ways all the sig-
nificant points that need to be made are part
of a physicalist-level account.
If this characterization of the three au-
thors is accepted, then perhaps I was too
hasty in flatly stating that naturalism does
not refer to an emphasis on nature in a way
analogous to humanism's emphasis on the
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human. It might now be possible to say that
the import of defining an ethical theory as
coming from a position of evolutionary natu-
ralism is that this ensures that one cannot
make recourse to something outside of na-
ture as the ground, or justification, for a
theory. It is clear that this would represent
the "strong naturalist position." Ethical sys-
tems are not just constructed to look like the
natural world; they are wholly entailed by it.
In saying this, the discussion of the use
of the term evolutioh must be born in mind.
By asserting that ethical systems are wholly
entailed by the natural world is not to say
Mayr tries to walk the fine line
between being able to give an evolu-
tionary account of ethical behavior
and saying that there is something
unique about what we do when we
act ethically.
that the world provides a well-defined set of
norms on a silver platter. Culture does make
significant contributions to the possible
realm of ethical practices, but these ethics
must be accountable to the "rule of nature."
An ethical system that does not tell us to act
in ways that will allow us to survive will not
itself survive. Either it will be replaced by a
system that is better suited to the environ-
ment, or we, as its physical manifestations,
will perish. Intriguingly, this is a return to
Mayr's view of ethics. The major difference
between the evolutionary humanist position
and the evolutionary naturalist position does
not seem to lie in the idea of nature as a con-
straint on ethics. What, then, is the differ-
ence? I look to the three authors for answers.
Ernst Mayr
Mayr's evolutionary humanism has al-
ready been discussed, with its ties, for him,
to an environmental ethic. In this section, I
explore his argument in more detail, with a
particular eye toward answering the ques-
tion, Where does Mayr believe the justifi-
cation for his ethic comes from? Having
presented this, I will turn to the question of
whether to accept his account of things.
It is worthwhile to ask whether Mayr's
evolutionary humanism is really a form of
naturalism, or whether his desire for an an-
thropocentric focus ultimately force him in
a different direction. The possibility of be-
ing both a humanist and a naturalist has al-
ready been noted. The reason for asking this
question directly of Mayr,
then, has to do with his justi-
fication for being so human-
centered. The question could
be rephrased this way: Is it
possible to assert a strongly
humanist ethical program that
remains firmly grounded in
naturalistic explanation?
Mayr lays out his philo-
sophical task in constructing
an evolutionary humanist
ethic by identifying what he
believes to be the central problem for any
kind of naturalistic ethic: How can the ex-
istence of altruistic behavior in humans be
accounted for, given the intrinsic human
egocentrism that is so often assumed by evo-
lutionary theory? To begin addressing this
question, Mayr finds it necessary to parse
altruism into three categories: inclusive fit-
ness altruism, reciprocal altruism, and genu-
ine altruism. From the name given to the
third category, one can anticipate that Mayr
intends to make value judgments about
them. In fact, what he does is to argue for a
hierarchical structure of altruism. This hi-
erarchy fits neatly into his evolutionary ac-
count, as he frames the altruism categories
in language taken from evolutionary theory.
One might even be led so far as to see these
various forms of altruism as emerging in as-
cending order, as one moves from less so-
cial to more social animals.
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Two strands of Mayr's ethical thought
can be discerned in this division. He is
clearly trying, first of all, to provide an evo-
lutionary account for the origin and the de-
velopment of ethics. Thus, he firmly plants
himself in the naturalistic camp—and not
just the soft kind of naturalism, but hard natu-
ralism. It seems undeniable that Mayr wants,
at least at some level, to give ethics a natu-
ralistic explanation. What this level is and
where it ends will be of interest as I inquire
into the question of the justification of his
project. The second strand to highlight in
Mayr's thought is the influence of Huxley,
mentioned above.
These are not just three different, but
intrinsically equal, forms of altruism. Note
the names. The first two draw upon evolu-
tionary language. The third, where he wants
to locate what is traditionally thought of as
human altruism, is dubbed genuine altruism.
Interestingly, Mayr's move to distinguish
between the first two and the third simulta-
neously accomplishes two things. First, it
allows him to make the claim that human
altruism (generally of the third kind) is not
just selfish action disguised in fancy clothes.
When altruistic acts of the third kind are
performed, a person makes a genuine sacri-
fice simply for the sake of, say, compassion.
Such an action cannot easily, or in a straight-
forward fashion, be explained away as a
form of hidden selfishness.
This analysis might be acceptable, by
and large. After all, when constructing an
ethical system, one wants to be able to say
that at least some actions are not done solely
for the rewards they will give. At the same
time, genuine altruism forces the question
of what happened to the naturalistic expla-
nation. Has Mayr gone too far in his claim
about genuine altruism? Can he say that it
is qualitatively different from types one and
two, but still claim to be able to account for
it naturalistically?
Mayr does not actually want to make a
grand distinction between genuine altruism
and the other forms. He seems to recognize
precisely this danger of undermining his own
explanatory framework, if he drives the
wedge too deep. So how exactly does he
distinguish what it is that we human beings
do in our moments of ethical greatness? One
of Mayr's key points is that genuine altru-
ism is a form of ethics; the others are not. In
order for there to be ethical behavior, there
must be a capacity for choice that does not,
according to Mayr, exist in much of nature
other than humanity. This is his first point.
His second point is that genuine altruism is
an expression of this ability to choose. In
genuine altruism we, in a way, transcend our
biology. 17 This is a problematic concept and
one to return to later. For now, Mayr sees
examples of the transcendence of biology in
such actions as choosing to cooperate with
a group larger than one's kin, for the wel-
fare of the extended tribe. In this way, Mayr
tries to walk the fine line between being able
to give an evolutionary account of ethical
behavior and saying that there is something
unique about what we do when we act ethi-
cally.
Mayr should be applauded for this bal-
ancing act. Quite often in naturalistic ex-
planations, the world is flattened into an
uninteresting, desolate landscape. Rather
than confining themselves to descriptions
of the evolutionary origins of ethical im-
pulses, such explanations encompass all
ethical behaviors in a monistic, physicalist
language. Such description is uninterest-
ing, because it claims there is nothing else
to say about ethical behavior other than, for
example, what the neurophysiologist says
about brain chemistry. Mayr is attempting
something much richer, something that also
takes a lot less hubris. He openly states that
his evolutionary humanism must appeal
both to the natural sciences and to the hu-
manities. As a result of this dual emphasis,
Mayr does not believe his evolutionary hu-
manism can be derived strictly from biologi-
cal evolution. What is important to him,
however, is that his ethical system be con-
sistent with biological evolution in ways that
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traditional ethical systems, which he claims do
not take biology into account, are not. One
could, perhaps, ask if Mayr weights biology
and culture equally. I suspect that he does not. 18
He is asserting an evolutionary humanism.
Evolution comes first. This represents a cer-
tain commitment, as a scientist, to the epistemic
values of science that give it a pride of place
among truth-claiming enterprises. Traditional
ethical systems are insufficient, not just be-
cause they do not consider the possible contri-
butions of evolution—'-nor neurophysiology, for
that matter. Rather, they are insufficient, be-
cause in not taking these contributions into ac-
count, traditional ethical theories are somewhat
ethereal: they hover above the head, instead
of rooting themselves firmly in the body. The
only way so to root ethics is to listen to what
the sciences have to say about human consti-
tution, and to figure out in what ways this con-
strains the possibilities for ethical theory.
So where does Mayr place the justifica-
tion for his particular ethical system? As noted
above, Mayr does seem to be attempting to
construct a genuinely naturalistic ethic. Mayr
himself states that evolution alone does not
give a structured ethical system. Thus, by ne-
cessity, he must go elsewhere to flesh out his
system fully. He still wants his ethic to be
naturalistic, however. In order to see how suc-
cessful he is in making it so, one should not
ask whether or not he imports anything from
"'outside"' evolution, but rather, how conso-
nant his final theory is with evolution.
Mayr's claim would be that his evolution-
ary humanism, with its strong environmental
component, is very consonant with evolution.
Is he correct in his claim? Mayr uses the lan-
guage of "rights" when defending the environ-
mental portions of his ethic. It is his claim
that humans have no right to destroy other spe-
cies. 19 The sheer fact that a species has come
into existence through the process of evolu-
tion tells him this. But is this claim consonant
with evolution? Species do become extinct;
there are rather extensive records of animals
that no longer exist. Did the meteoroid that is
hypothesized to have wiped out the dinosaurs
have no right to do that? This seems an odd
use of language.
There are at least three possible explana-
tions for such language with respect to human
activities. The first possibility is that perhaps
Mayr desires a steady-state environment for
the world today. After all, given his progres-
sivist tendencies, he might think the world has
reached an optimum state with the evolution
of human beings. However, this vision is not
very indicative of the history of the planet and
would certainly create strong discord between
his ethical vision and evolution. A second pos-
sibility is that Mayr does not object so much
to the human extinction of other species in
general, as to the astonishing rate at which it is
occurring. This would be much more in keep-
ing with his evolutionary views, and seems
more likely. A final possibility is that, perhaps,
by invoking the language of rights, he is mak-
ing a self-referential argument. When he as-
serts that we have no right to destroy other spe-
cies, he is not supposing the existence of a
trans-species ethical system that human beings,
as all other animals, are subject to. Instead, he
is simply saying that we are ethical beings; and,
as such, we should recognize that what we are
doing, in pressing other species into extinction,
is unethical. While this possibility presupposes
his ethical concerns, it is a promising idea. (It
also points toward the perspective of Lynn
Margulis.) According to this third possibility,
it could be said that Mayr's ultimate justifica-
tion for his ethical system lies in a transcen-
dent human capacity—namely, the ability to
choose one's actions. With this freedom as a
given, Mayr sees ethical systems as justified
by the presence or absence of a harmony be-
tween the choices we actually make and the
constraints of evolution. While he would cer-
tainly argue that his ethical system is justified
by this account, others might counter that, in
the end, his emphasis on human well-being un-
dermines it.
E. O. Wilson
Straddling the board between evolution-
ary humanism and naturalism is Edward O.
Wilson. Since he was a student of Mayr's, it
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is not surprising to find some similarities be-
tween the two. Both are ardent environmen-
talists, and, for both, this care for the world is
expressed in their ethical system. They also
share a belief in the epistemic power of sci-
ence as uniquely able, among all human in-
tellectual endeavors, to reach knowledge
about how the world "really" is. For Wilson,
however, the proper approach to ethics is em-
piricism. Juxtaposing this approach to tran-
scendentalism, which bases its claims of au-
thority on some unchanging truth beyond the
realm of the natural world, Wilson asserts that
the roots of ethical systems lie in the natural
world. This being the case, science is at least
a natural ally in the search for ethical founda-
tions, and perhaps even the most skillful one.
In setting out this contrast between the
transcendentalist and empiricist schools of
ethics, Wilson makes a fine distinction be-
tween ethics and moral behavior. In a sense,
morals are how we describe what we do. Eth-
Mayr and Wilson both seem very
close to asserting that the moral
behaviors we "naturally" embody
should be accepted, without question,
as the correct moral position for
developing an ethic.
ics represents a systematic reflection upon
these actions, and a codification of them.
Morals are behaviors; ethics are theoretical
structures. The two are not unrelated. Ac-
cording to Wilson, the biological roots of
moral behavior can be empirically explored,
"explaining their material origins and biases."
20 Morals, then, provide an entree into the
empirical examination of ethical systems,
since ethical systems represent the social codi-
fication of such biologically motivated behav-
iors. Thus, both morals and, through them.
ethics are open to scientific investigation and,
hence, naturalistic explications.
In fact, Wilson makes the far stronger
claim that not only are morals and ethics open
to scientific investigation, the results of these
investigations, if utilized properly, lead to the
development of stable ethical codes. This as-
pect of Wilson's vision of the project of ethics
is strikingly similar to Mayr's. An evolution-
ary ethical system provides the best available
ethical system, because it employs the "fun-
damental" knowledge of the sciences as its
foundation. One might be suspicious that this
is a flirtation with the naturalistic fallacy:
Mayr and Wilson both seem very close to as-
serting that the moral behaviors we "naturally"
embody should be accepted, without question,
as the correct moral position for developing
an ethic. I have already shown that Mayr does
not want to make this assertion, so he should
be excused. Wilson, however, is quite happy
to take this direction. He refutes the validity
of the naturalistic fallacy by
arguing that if Kant, Moore,
and Rawls had had the ben-
efit ofmodem biological re-
flection, they would not
have thought the way they
did. One should, perhaps,
hope that Wilson, with this
attitude, is closer to the
naturalist end of the scale
than the humanist end. An
explicitly anthropocentric
ethic like Mayr's, combined
with a rejection of the natu-
ralistic fallacy, could quickly devolve into an
instrumentalist view of nature. We know that
Wilson is an environmentalist; so the question
becomes why. Is it only because human be-
ings need the planet for their own existence?
Wilson does, in fact, seem to argue in
this direction. But for him, this is entirely in
keeping with his desire to construct an evo-
lutionary ethic. He endorses what he terms
a "naturalistic self-image" of human beings,
balanced on a razor's edge—the "biosphere
within which a thousand imaginable hells are
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possible but only one paradise." 21 Our ac-
tions are threatening to knock us off this
razor's edge—or rather, they are threatening
to destroy the razor altogether. Thus, when
we argue for an environmental ethic, we are
doing so for selfish reasons. It seems that, in
the end, Mayr's third form of altruism, "genu-
ine altruism," is wrong, and that natural se-
lection ensures that our ethics, in the long run,
work for our benefit.
Does this mean that there is a correct
ethical system for the world today? The
answer to this question depends on which
level of description is engaged. Wilson, like
Mayr, makes certain claims about the rela-
tion of culture to biology. While physicalis-
tic mechanisms, in general, can be discov-
ered that select out broad behavioral char-
acteristics for our species, these character-
istics often, or perhaps always, find unique
expression through cultural systems. Ethi-
cal systems are not simply by-products of
biological evolution, but they do need to be
properly understood—that is, they must be
understood as based in our genetic heritage,
in response to the environment. This proper
understanding is at the heart of Wilson's
contrast between empiricist and transcenden-
talist ethics. By appealing to justification
outside the natural world, the transcenden-
talists are committing themselves to some-
thing that is unacceptable to Wilson and his
naturalistic agenda: a special realm closed
to the epistemic power of science.
As for a correct ethical system for the
situation today, Wilson would probably ar-
gue for multiple ethical systems. Each would
be a product of its unique cultural milieu, but
underlying the many differences would be
an essential core, comprised of certain ge-
netic behavioral tendencies and the fact that
overpopulation is threatening the survival of
our species. These are not the only possible
ethical systems; certainly there are others that
are arguably driving the continued degrada-
tion of the environment. Wilson would ar-
gue that these evolutionary ethics are the only
viable ethics for our continued survival.
What can be said about the justifica-
tion for Wilson's ethical vision? Even more
so than Mayr does, Wilson seeks to estab-
lish the roots for his system in evolution.
For both authors, evolution does not simply
give us ethics on a silver platter (although,
for Wilson, it may be slightly more able to
do so). The interaction of culture and biol-
ogy is what generates ethical systems. The
justification for any particular ethical sys-
tem is grounded, however, in evolutionary
criteria. Cultures can choose their ethics,
no doubt. The argument is that what con-
stitutes a "good" ethical system is its ability
to make human beings adaptive. If this
sounds a bit impersonal, Wilson points to
culture, which puts different faces on this
essentially adaptive system. His emphasis
on the existence of such naturalistic criteria
for what makes an ethical system "good"
undermines Mayr's idea that evolution does
not give us a preset ethical code. Nature
does, in fact, seem to provide a list of pre-
cepts. These may be modulated by culture,
but for Wilson, at least, they are there, be-
low the surface, waiting to be discovered
by empirical investigation.
One of the outcomes of this kind of
strong naturalistic program does, however,
seem to be a human focus. Ethical systems
should emphasize our well-being, because
that is their purpose. Ethics, in the systems
of both Mayr and Wilson, arose for the pur-
pose of group cohesion. Ethical systems are
adaptive. They are intended to help us sur-
vive and thrive. Does this mean that an evo-
lutionary ethic is more suited to being human-
istic than strictly naturalistic? Lynn Margulis
may shed some light on this matter.
Lynn Margulis
At the outset of a discussion of
Margulis' thought, it should noted that talk
of evolutionary naturalism or humanism is
foreign language. These are not terms that
she uses to describe her position; however, I
think a strong case can be made for using
them in talking about her views on ethics.
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In order to understand Margulis' views
on evolution, it is necessary to bring in the
concept of symbiosis. This can be described
in a bare-bones manner as the living together
in physical contact of life-forms of various
species. 22 Margulis makes the claim that
most life, perhaps even all life, tends to ex-
ist symbiotically. This idea leads her to have
certain affinities for James Lovelock's Gaia
Hypothesis. Although Margulis considers
the kind of New Age p
nature spirituality that
has built up around the
Gaia Hypothesis to be
anathema, she insists
that on its own, it is a
scientific theory. In-
deed, it is a theory quite
similar to her own idea
of a symbiotic planet.
As one of her students
once pointed out, Gaia
is symbiosis as seen from space. 23 In order
to understand how the two fit together, the
bare-bones description of symbiosis will
have to be filled out slightly. When Margulis
says that symbiosis entails the living together
of species in physical contact, she does not
restrict this to direct physical contact. All
life on the planet is in physical contact
through the exchange of gases in the atmo-
sphere. Taken as a whole, then, the earth
represents a vast symbiotic system: Gaia.
In claiming that all life exists symbiotically,
Margulis is not asserting that symbiosis is
necessary for life, but rather that it is apart
of life. A single organism on its own may
once have been able to survive; but, given
the sophistication of the biosphere today, no
single organism can go it alone. All are
locked together in ever-expanding, intercon-
nected spheres of interdependence.
At the same that she makes this claim,
Margulis also asserts that no part—or parts
—
is indispensable to the continuation of life.
This is the point at which to pursue Margulis'
notion of ethics. She makes two claims that
reverberate throughout her writing: no spe-
cies is inherently more important than any
other, and life will go on. The first of these
should, at least on the surface, seem like a
direct challenge to Mayr's evolutionary hu-
manism. Against his progressivist views,
which place Homo sapiens at the top of the
heap in every way, Margulis suggests that if
any life-form is going to be privileged, it
should be bacteria. After all, they are the
source of all other life, and they are the most
By appealing to justification outside the
natural world, the transcendentalists are
committing themselves to something that
is unacceptable to Wilson and his natu-
ralistic agenda: a special realm closed to
the epistemic power of science.
likely forms of life to survive practically any-
thing. From an evolutionary point of view,
therefore, they seem to be the most impor-
tant. But this view may just reflect a profes-
sional bias on Margulis' part. She also says
that we should consider ourselves special.
In fact, her emphasis on considering our-
selves special is the most distinguishing fea-
ture of her ethical vision.
Her second claim, that life will go on,
gives some hints as to what Margulis sees
as the ultimate value. In her book, Symbi-
otic Planet. Margulis pokes fun at environ-
mentalists who run around, calling people
to action with the battle cry, "Save the
planet!" What hubris this is! We cannot save
the planet. We do not need to save the planet.
The planet will take care of itself. What we
need to save is ourselves. And what we need
to save ourselves from is... ourselves. Like
Mayr and Wilson, Margulis seems to be con-
cerned with the "'environmental crisis." Also
like Mayr and Wilson. Margulis thinks that
it is important for us to stop our destructive
actions. But for Margulis, we do not need
to do this because we have no "right" to kill
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other species. Since no species is intrinsi-
cally any more important than any other, if
the Florida panther is to be replaced by green
slime mold, so be it. If we are to make any
kind of ethical argument for why we should
save the Florida panther, we had better rec-
ognize that we are doing it because we like
furry animals more than muck. 24
Margulis' vision of ethics is a two-tiered
system. At one level, a particular ethical
system ought to be such that it does not lead
us to a change the environment so much that
we are no longer suited to it. If it does di-
rect us to change our environment to such
an extent, then, as Mayr and Wilson would
agree, natural selection will chose against
Margulis concludes that we are not that
special, and if we become extinct, too had
for us. Nature does not care one way or
another if we survive. What matters in
the end is that "life" survives. Itsform
does not matter.
that system; and if we are unwilling to
modify it, then we as a species will go down
with our ethics. Notice, however, that much
of the value-laden language found in Mayr
or Wilson is absent in Margulis. It is not
that we might destroy our environment, but,
rather, that we will simply change it; and this
could be so much the worse for us.
Margulis also offers a more immediate
level of ethics—immediate in the sense of
being close to commonplace understandings
of how to judge behaviors. At this level,
Margulis is quite happy to say that we choose
what we want to value. These choices, of
course, need to be in consonance with the
level of natural selection. Like Mayr and
Wilson, Margulis is not able to get away
from the idea that the physical processes of
the world constrain what goes on at "higher"
levels. This constraining power, however,
is somewhat less tightly formulated in her
vision. She does not seem to view species
loss as portending imminent doom for our
species, who could survive without butter-
flies and tigers and warblers. The question
for Margulis is whether or not we want to
survive that way.
With the insistence that many of our
most pressing ethical choices are based on
our own vision of the kind of world we want
to live in, Margulis seems to be closing a
circle here. Beginning with Mayr's human-
ism, where questions arose as to how fully
his project could be considered to be a natu-
ralistic one, this analysis moved on to
Wilson's work, with its
emphasis on natural-
ism, which seemed to
be moving back in the
direction of human-
ism. Now, with
Margulis, a thorough-
going ethic based on
evolutionary natural-
ism is again encoun-
tered, one that leads to
a humanistic vision.
This anthropocen-
trism, however, is not based, as Mayr's is,
on a progressivist belief in the supremacy
of human beings. Rather, it is based on an
acknowledgement that if naturalism is to be
taken seriously, we must recognize that we
will inevitably focus on ourselves. This
makes the formulation of normative ethical
claims about how we should treat the envi-
ronment a bit more difficult, but encourage-
ment may be found in the fact that all of these
authors feel strongly about changing the way
in which we view the environment.
Where to go from here?
In beginning to develop some norma-
tive conclusions of my own, I would like to
look more closely at some of the possible
implications that a move from evolutionary
naturalism to evolutionary humanism might
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imply for the form and basis of an ethical
system. Margulis' program develops some
of these implications, but it is necessary to
ask whether her conclusions are the only, or
even the best, possible interpretation. As has
been noted, Margulis pushes naturalism to
an extreme. As a result, while her ethics are
underpinned at a deep level by biological
evolution, they become more open to cul-
tural influences. This vision is not discon-
tinuous with that of Wilson; for both, there
is a sense of levels, with biological evolu-
tion forming the base and culture being a
source of novelty. The main difference
seems to lie in how closely Margulis and
Wilson link these two levels. For Margulis,
the levels are linked, but their connection is
rather remote. Viable ethical systems can
take a wide array of forms. The important
question here is not whether a particular ethi-
cal system is viable biologically, but whether
it is acceptable aesthetically or spiritually. 25
Culture becomes much more powerful for
Margulis than for Wilson, not only generat-
ing novelty, but also representing a strong
selective pressure, as an ethic is chosen based
on the kind of world we want to live in. We
human beings can say we are special, and
we can generate ethical systems based on
this idea; but ultimately this just represents
our own preference. Margulis concludes that
we are not that special, and if we become
extinct, too bad for us. Nature does not care
one way or another if we survive. What
matters in the end is that "life" survives. Its
form does not matter. Thus, while Margulis,
by and large, would be considered an evolu-
tionary naturalist, in terms of ethics she
seems to be an humanist, given the role of
choice in ethical systems. For Wilson, on
the other hand, the connection between lev-
els in ethics is much more tightly drawn.
There is a limited range of viable ethical
schemes, because the primary selective force
is natural selection. Wilson makes much
more of the fact that the range of survivable
environments for human beings is preciously
small—thousands of possible hells, but only
one paradise. He tries to integrate his ethi-
cal humanism into a broader evolutionary
naturalism. When we assert that our survival
does matter, it is not just a case of express-
ing our desires—or rather, it is an expres-
sion of our desire, but this itself is given a
naturalistic interpretation.
It is important to understand what is
meant by this point. In many ways, Wilson's
attempt to give a naturalistic interpretation
of our desires leads him to a much more sat-
isfying account of the relation between na-
ture and culture. The careful construction
of this relationship will help us in creating
our own account of an ethical system based
on evolutionary naturalism. Mayr has
claimed that human beings have transcended
nature through culture. Technological soci-
ety has made us so powerful that, according
to Mayr, it would no longer be correct to
understand human beings as part of nature. 26
But if we are not a part of nature, what are
we? To use the language of transcendence
to imply that humans have somehow gained
a measure of autonomy from nature makes
sense only in a very limited way. Mayr him-
self acknowledges this. He claims the need
to construct ethical theories in response to
scientific knowledge about human being, be-
cause we are, in fundamental ways, prod-
ucts of physicalistic processes. At the same
time, however, Mayr drives a wedge deeply
between humanity and nature.
Interestingly, Margulis seems to wind
up with the same divide. Despite her much
more thoroughgoing naturalism, Margulis'
emphasis on the arbitrariness of many ethi-
cal choices belies an underlying split be-
tween biology and culture. She acknowl-
edges that, while humans may be capable of
surviving in a world consisting mostly of
brackish waterways and concrete, she thinks
we should ask if this is the kind of world we
want to live in. Her personal inclination is
to answer "no": a world with trees and flow-
ers, furry animals and clear water is more
appealing to the human psyche, and even im-
portant to human spirituality. But this is as
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far as she goes. Margulis does not tie these
features of humanity into her evolutionary
framework. Perhaps she should not be
judged too harshly, as her interest in evolu-
tion is not in macroorganisms. But the con-
clusion is that, by not tying these elements
into her naturalistic description, she comes
away with an incomplete account of the re-
lation of ethics to evolutionary naturalism.
This is where Wilson's grand attempt
at epistemological synthesis, Consilience,
comes into its own. Nothing is left un-
touched in Wilson's quest to argue for the
possibility of a completely naturalistic ac-
count of the world. Art, religion, and ethics
all come under his critical gaze, with the in-
tent of showing that the humanistic fields
that study them can also be brought into the
general fold of scientific investigation.
While one may agree or disagree with
Wilson's assessment of the relationship be-
tween the humanities and the sciences, it
seems undeniable that his argument is the
strongest attempt to ground an evolutionary
humanism in naturalistic explanation.
In doing so, Wilson seems to remove
the distinction between biology and culture.
That is not to say that he does not think that
culture exists. Certainly it does. In fact, its
existence is the driving force behind
Consilience. As has been shown in the spe-
cific case of ethics, however, Wilson wants
to reject the transcendentalism rampant in
"traditional'* accounts of human culture. All
aspects of culture, he says, must ultimately
be rooted in biology, a claim that causes
many readers to recoil from his program.
Such a naturalism often winds up being a
"nothing but" kind of materialism. I do not
think this is what Wilson wants to do. He is
trying to close the gap between biology and
culture, but he does not think culture can be
explained away. One can still meaningfully
talk about the beauty of a painting, even if
the neural states that correspond to this feel-
ing are thoroughly understood. The fear of
biological reductionism is tied up with the
fear of determinism. For Wilson, however.
emergence is a genuine phenomenon. His
naturalistic enterprise is predicated on the
idea that the emergent property is real, and
on the belief that it is constrained in certain
ways by "lower" levels. Understanding
these lower levels can give greater clarity
when trying to understand the "higher" lev-
els. Perhaps more troubling is Wilson's re-
jection of the naturalistic fallacy. Naturalis-
tic arguments have frequently been used to
support what we now consider to be unethi-
cal social doctrines. And, at a more abstract
level, a rejection of the naturalistic fallacy
can be seen to exacerbate the dichotomy
between nature and culture: because things
are biologically given to us in a certain way,
we should not try to change them through
social mechanisms.
So what does all this mean for an attempt
to construct an evolutionary ethics? The im-
portant point to take from Wilson is that cul-
ture is not distinct from biology. So, when
Margulis says that an ethical choice to try to
preserve furry animals is just based on aes-
thetic considerations, the possibility of bring-
ing this preference into a naturalistic account
should be insisted upon. In doing so, a strong
move toward a genuinely naturalistic evolu-
tionary humanism would be made. Of
course, this may actually be quite difficult to
do. Despite Wilson's confidence that it is
quite "natural" for humans to think that the
"natural world" is beautiful. 27 one runs up
against the difficult question of what consti-
tutes the natural world. Is it the kinds of
places set aside as National Parks? If so, does
this designation not once again introduce the
old split between humans and the rest of na-
ture? This kind of vision of nature also opens
up a host of social justice issues, because
those in the developed West desire to pre-
serve "pristine nature" not just in developed
nations, but also in developing countries, of-
ten to the financial detriment of certain
groups of their citizens.
Despite these difficulties, however, I do
want to be able to make the assertion, in a
naturalistic evolutionary humanism, that one
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person's claim for superhighways and indus-
trialization and another person's claim for
land and species conservation can both be
ethically desirable. It is in order to address
this kind of question that I suspect that all
three authors introduce the idea of levels into
their discussions of ethics. By doing so, they
can say that both of the aforementioned
views represent ethical visions. But perhaps
one of them is more viable by evolutionary
criteria, because it is more advantageous to
our survival. If so, this gives Mayr, Wilson,
and Margulis the authority to make norma-
tive claims about which ethical system one
should choose to follow.
Is this satisfying, or does it once again
seem to make the naturalistic argument a
reductionistic, deterministic physicalism? I
would argue that it does not rob us of a role
in determining our ethical vision, beyond
merely being along for the ride. As evolu-
tionists, all three authors recognize an im-
portant aspect about all life: by its very ex-
istence it transforms its environment. For
Mayr, this is why human beings are set apart
from nature. For Margulis, this is what gets
symbiosis going in the first place. Regard-
less of the particular
spin put on this environ-
mental impact, it does
have certain implica-
tions for the consider-
ation of ethics. In re-
sponse to the claim that
an appeal to natural se-
lection for a justification
of ethical systems de-
grades ethics to the low-
est common denomina-
tor, I appeal to the im-
pact that particular ethical systems have on
the world. Mayr, Wilson, and Margulis all
recognize that such an evolutionarily viable
ethic is realizable in multiple ways. But
given this multiplicity, should it be assumed
that, in the long run, they are all equivalent?
This seems very unlikely. The point that is
being pursued here is that, while it might
perhaps be said that natural selection deter-
mines which ethical systems are viable, other
selection criteria must also come into effect
in choosing which ethic actually becomes
manifest—or rather, since I wish to avoid a
split between biology and culture, natural
selection itself works in a multitude of ways.
What might these other selection crite-
ria be? In order to answer this question, it
would be helpful to review briefly. Evolu-
tionary naturalism, a philosophy that has
been evident in all three authors to a greater
or lesser extent, provides the idea that any
ethical system needs to be consonant with
natural selection. Any system that allows
us to approve of the rampant destruction of
the natural world will ultimately be rejected
by evolution, because we rely on the natural
world for our survival. If we alter it suffi-
ciently, we will find ourselves no longer
suited to this altered environment, and we
will be supplanted by a species better
adapted. This would be a strict, naturalistic
account of ethics. Two varieties of human-
isms have been encountered. For Mayr, it
takes the form of a progressivist vision of
history that sees humans as the climax of
Cultural selection is not differentfrom
natural selection; it is natural selec-
tion operating through the historical
contingencies ofhuman cultural
preferences.
evolution. For Margulis. humanism is re-
stricted to the realm of ethics. Our species
is not special, as seen from the perspective
of evolution; we are special only from our
own perspective. Both of these two variet-
ies of humanism assert that our desires are
paramount in the development of an ethical
scheme. How each author arrives there, and
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how each interprets what this means, how-
ever, is quite different. But for the present
purposes, it is their common emphasis on
humankind that is important. By giving hu-
man beings a significant role in the selec-
tion of ethical systems, they help answer the
question of what other selection criteria
might exist besides natural selection: one
of them would be cultural selection.
Having stated this so baldly, however, I
realize that this is not where I want to go. I
have been trying to avoid a split between
biology and culture. In order to do so, I need
to think in terms of a naturalistic evolution-
ary humanism. Naturalistic terms are
needed, because biology really does tell
something about what being human is. What
about evolutionary humanism? Care must
be taken not to interpret this in Mayr's pro-
gressivist way. Rather, evolutionary human-
ism can mean that humans are embedded in
nature. We are evolved beings, and every-
thing about us is part of nature. I do not
want to assert simply an ethical humanism
akin to Margulis'; this is too dismissive of
the fact that our desires to decide about the
way the world is or should be are not just
ours, somehow separate from nature. Hu-
man desires and motivations need to be in-
corporated into a naturalistic and evolution-
ary framework. If this can be done, then a
meaningful response can be given to the
question of the "otherness" of cultural se-
lection criteria. Cultural selection is not dif-
ferent from natural selection; it is natural se-
lection operating through the historical con-
tingencies of human cultural preferences.
Thinking in this way is vitally impor-
tant in the formulation of new ethical sys-
tems. In the split between biology and cul-
ture, there is a shift in timescales that threat-
ens to make a strictly biologically selected
ethic irrelevant. We may be significantly
altering our environment too quickly for the
more traditional kind of natural selection to
respond to. We do not have the luxury of
waiting for natural selection (in the limited
sense) to tell us what is viable and what is
not. We can look to natural selection as a
guide—to see what, in general, seems to
work and what does not; but in the end we
must make the value judgment. Evolution
does not make value judgments. Thus, there
is even more reason to think that we should
not look to a limited notion of natural selec-
tion as the arbiter of which ethical system to
adopt. Evolution may play a nasty trick on
us and "choose" against us. By finding a
place for ourselves, culture and all, within
natural selection, perhaps it can even be ar-
gued that evolution can make value judge-
ments. If we value our survival, we can
choose to adopt ethical systems that will fa-
vor our continued existence. In construct-
ing such ethical systems, I have tried to ar-
gue that a naturalistic evolutionary human-
ism offers the best hope. Drawing on evo-
lutionary naturalism's desire to collapse the
separation between human beings and the
rest of the world, a rigorous ethical system
can be constructed that takes human being
seriously. At the same time, however, it does
not wash out our distinctiveness. We are,
after all, human. As the actors in our ethical
systems, we should take on a central role.
By affirming that we are human beings, em-
bedded in the world, naturalistic evolution-
ary humanism allows us to see ourselves as
an integrated part of the natural world, and
to act accordingly.
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